Chip diversion, insider risk, and what technology companies can do now
November 19, 2026
United States
United States
United States
At a glance
US semiconductor chips and other dual-use technologies are reaching China through intermediary third countries, often in violation of US export controls.
An overseas purchaser of a sensitive product may appear to be in one country, say, Singapore or the UAE, when in reality the “purchaser” is nothing more than a front company diverting the product to a restricted Chinese entity. There is also a risk that foreign intelligence services may try to divert sensitive products by cultivating personal relationships with people inside US companies, creating insider and influence risks that ordinary trade compliance programs were not designed to catch.
In the past, US authorities typically treated such schemes as national security matters, investigating them from a counterintelligence perspective, often through classified channels.
Now, though, increased scrutiny means US authorities may use their entire toolbox to combat export control violations, including public filings and criminal enforcement tools like smuggling, fraud, and money laundering statutes.
Companies that review their distribution channels, cloud and reseller relationships, and insider-risk controls now will be in a much better position if a subpoena, a search warrant, or a call from an agent arrives.
How diversion through third countries works
For years US investigators have been on the lookout for trade irregularities in countries that maintain deep economic ties to both the United States and China. And for good reason: such strategically placed third countries can often serve as a conduit for commercial goods between the US and China when more direct access is not possible. As just one example, Singapore law does not necessarily prohibit transferring advanced AI chips to Chinese companies, but those same transactions can violate US export controls. Washington routinely presses these strategically placed third countries to act against companies suspected of facilitating Chinese attempts to obtain US technology.
To identify possible illegal diversion schemes, US authorities often look for red flags. Compliance teams looking to avoid potential enforcement actions can watch for these red flags, including:
Layered ownership. Local trading or cloud companies that change hands through multiple offshore holding vehicles, often with the same individuals with close business ties to China appearing as directors across related entities.
Multiple regional affiliates. Businesses based in one country, such as Singapore, may use subsidiaries or trading partners in neighboring countries such as Malaysia, which has become a major hub for data centers that sell computing power to Chinese companies.
Financing and collateral links. Unexplained loans from the actual end user or its affiliates to the intermediary, sometimes secured by the intermediary’s entire business, can reveal who is really behind a transaction.
False destination paperwork. Forged documents or other papers that give a false impression of the actual end-user’s actual location can expose actors throughout the supply chain to liability.
Sudden supply chain changes after enforcement efforts. US authorities know that enforcement efforts in one intermediary country can often push shipments to other countries with less oversight, where they may be harder to track. Companies may find the government’s attention moves with the trade routes.
The insider dimension: when the threat is personal
Diversion is not always a matter of a dishonest intermediary customer or a forged end-user certificate. Foreign intelligence services have long recognized that the fastest route to sensitive technology often runs through people: executives, engineers, sales staff, and business development teams who control access, relationships, and allocation decisions. Those approaches may take the form of a promising business partner, a well-connected investor, a trusted friend, or even a romantic relationship.
These situations are delicate. They frequently involve no obvious red flag in a transaction record, and they can implicate an employee’s private life, a company’s reputation, and its relationship with federal investigators all at once. Handling them well calls for counsel who understands how counterintelligence and trade fraud investigations are actually run, how the FBI and DOJ’s Criminal Division evaluate corporate cooperation, how classified discovery issues can create pressure points in government investigations, and how both the company and the individuals involved need to be protected in such situations.
What companies may consider doing now
Mapping the channel: Identifying every distributor, reseller, cloud partner, and data-center customer in high-risk transshipment jurisdictions, and confirming where controlled products physically go, not just where they are billed.
Looking through the corporate veil: Running beneficial ownership and director screening on intermediaries, paying particular attention to recent ownership changes, offshore holding companies, related-party financing, and sudden unexplained changes to a company’s principal location of business.
Testing end-use and end-user representations: Comparing stated capacity and business purpose against order volumes; rapid, outsized growth by a small intermediary may warrant a closer look.
Integrating trade and insider-risk programs: Ensuring security, compliance, and legal teams are sharing information about unusual personal relationships, gifts, travel, or contacts that touch allocation of controlled products.
Preparing for the knock on the door: Having a plan for responding to grand jury subpoenas, search warrants, agent interviews, and parallel foreign inquiries, and considering whether a voluntary self-disclosure would be in the company’s interest.
Remembering the money: Diversion investigations frequently include money laundering charges, which can carry heavier penalties than many trade statutes alone. Financial flows often deserve the same attention as shipping records.
How we can help
Eversheds Sutherland’s national security, white collar investigations, international trade, and litigation teams work together across a seamless global network to help clients assess their exposure, strengthen compliance programs, conduct internal investigations, respond to government inquiries in the United States and abroad, and, where necessary, defend them in court.
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