Seventh Circuit: Text messages can’t trigger Do Not Call claims under the TCPA

Steidinger is the most significant TCPA decision since the US Supreme Court’s 2025 holding that courts should not defer to Federal Communications Commission (FCC) interpretations of the TCPA, and it will be welcome news for companies that text consumers, if other courts follow suit. Nonetheless, the decision may not materially impact companies’ nationwide TCPA compliance programs as other federal circuits have not yet addressed the question.

Background

Section 227(c)(5) creates a private right of action for anyone who receives multiple unsolicited “telephone calls” in violation of the TCPA regulations in a 12-month period. The section is most commonly invoked in cases alleging violations of the DNC Registry provisions, including 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2), which prohibits certain telemarketing calls to numbers listed on the DNC Registry. The statute provides for statutory damages of up to $500 per violation, which creates significant class action risk.

Although the statute is silent on the question, for years federal courts concluded that text messages qualified as “telephone calls” under Section 227(c)(5). Those decisions relied on FCC interpretations of other TCPA provisions, specifically Sections 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) and 227(b)(1)(B), where the agency had concluded that texts should be treated similarly to calls.

As we covered in a prior alert, on June 20, 2025, that analytical framework came under scrutiny following the Supreme Court’s 2025 decision in McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corp. In McLaughlin, the Supreme Court confirmed that courts must “interpret the TCPA under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation, affording appropriate respect to the agency’s interpretation.” 606 US 146, 152 (2025). The Supreme Court’s ruling that “a district court must independently determine for itself whether the agency’s interpretation of a statute is correct” set off a critical reevaluation of Section 227(c)(5). Id. at 155.

In the wake of McLaughlin, district courts have been divided on whether text messages are telephone calls for purposes of Section 227(c)(5).¹

Seventh Circuit Decision

The Seventh Circuit’s Steidinger decision marked the first time that a federal appellate court weighed in on the issue post-McLaughlin. The unanimous panel concluded that Section 227(c)(5) “does not permit plaintiffs to sue for the receipt of unwanted texts.”

The court’s analysis focused on the ordinary meaning of the statutory phrase “telephone call” at the time Congress enacted the TCPA in 1991. The court first noted that although text messaging did not exist when the TCPA was enacted in 1991, that was not determinative because statutes can apply to technologies not yet existent when the statute was enacted.

The court instead looked to contemporary definitions of the relevant terms: “telephone” and “call.” The court reasoned: “[A] telephone was ‘[a]n instrument for reproducing sounds at a distance[.]’ And a call meant ‘to get or try to get into communication by telephone.’ Thus, in 1991, a ‘telephone call’ referred to communication via sound.” Steidinger, 2026 WL 2028517, at *2 (quoting Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1991)). The court observed that text messages do not reproduce sound, so they did not fall within the definition of “telephone call” in Section 227(c)(5).

The court also found support in the broader structure of the TCPA. In other provisions, Congress used different terminology, such as “telephone solicitation,” when it intended to regulate a wider range of communications. According to the court, Congress’s decision to use the narrower term “telephone call” in Section 227(c)(5) suggests that it intended a more limited scope.

Key Takeaways

The Seventh Circuit’s decision is a meaningful development for companies that use text messaging as part of their marketing and customer engagement strategies.

Key implications include:

• A significant defense to DNC-based text messaging claims in the Seventh Circuit. Within the Seventh Circuit, plaintiffs can no longer rely on Section 227(c)(5) to pursue private claims based solely on unwanted text messages.
• Potential influence nationwide. Although binding only in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin, Steidinger is likely to be cited extensively by businesses facing TCPA claims and courts across the country confronting the same question.
• Continued uncertainty in the TCPA litigation landscape. Other federal circuits have not yet addressed the issue, and district courts outside the Seventh Circuit may continue to reach different conclusions. This will continue to create uncertainty in TCPA compliance across the country.

Conclusion

While Steidinger narrows one avenue of TCPA exposure, it is unlikely to be the final word. Given the existing split among district courts and the prevalence of text-based marketing campaigns, additional appellate courts are likely to confront the issue in the near future. In the meantime, companies that text their customers and consumers at large can consider unsettled the question of whether they must obtain prior express consent before sending telemarketing text messages to numbers on the DNC Registry. 
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If you have any questions about this Legal Briefing, please feel free to contact any of the attorneys listed or the Eversheds Sutherland attorney with whom you regularly work.

_{1 Compare, e.g., Wilson v. MEDVIDI Inc., No. 5:25-CV-03996-BLF, 2025 WL 2856295 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2025) (concluding text messages are telephone calls) and Mey v. Liberty Home Guard, LLC, No. 5:23-CV-281, 2026 WL 486556 (N.D.W. Va. Jan. 5, 2026) (same), with Jones v. Blackstone Med. Servs., LLC, 792 F. Supp. 3d 894, 897 (C.D. Ill. 2025) (concluding text messages are not telephone calls) and Davis v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 797 F. Supp. 3d 1270, 1275 (N.D. Fla. 2025) (same).}